

SPECIFICATION

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

BE IT KNOWN that we, KOJI Chida, a subject of Japan and residing at Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa, Japan, KUNIO Kobayashi a subject of Japan and residing at Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa, Japan and HIKARU Morita, a subject of Japan and residing at Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa, Japan have invented certain new and useful improvements in "METHOD, APPARATUS AND PROGRAM FOR QUANTITATIVE COMPETITION AND RECORDING MEDIUM HAVING RECORDED THEREON THE PROGRAM"

and we do hereby declare that the following is a full, clear and exact description of the same; reference being had to the accompanying drawings and the numerals of reference marked thereon, which form a part of this specification.

METHOD, APPARATUS AND PROGRAM FOR QUANTITATIVE
COMPETITION AND RECORDING MEDIUM HAVING RECORDED
THEREON THE PROGRAM

5 BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus for
quantitative competition that compare users' aimed or intended values online,
for example, across the Internet while holding them in secrecy and specify the
maximum or minimum one of the intended values and only the user having
10 committed it as his intended value.

An example of the online quantitative competition is an "electronic
sealed-bit auction scheme." With this scheme, the maximum or minimum
value and the user having committed it as his intended value are specified,
and techniques for holding other information in secret. This scheme is
15 disclosed, for example, in Kobayashi and Morita, "Efficient sealed-bid
auction with quantitative competition using one-way functions," ISEC99.
Further, in H. Kikuchi, M. Harkavy and J.D. Tygar, "Multi-round anonymous
auction protocols," IEEE Workshop on Dependable and Real-Time
E-Commerce System, 1998, there is proposed a scheme that decides whether
20 there is a user having committed his intended value equal to or greater than or
smaller than a certain numerical value. The latter scheme has a disadvantage
that when plural users have committed the maximum or minimum value as
their intended values, those users cannot be specified and that they can detect
a second highest or lowest numerical value.

25 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

It is therefore an object of the present invention to provide a method
and apparatus that compare plural users' intended values online, specify the

maximum or minimum one of the users' intended values with high security and efficiently and, if necessary, the user of the intended value corresponding to the specified value but keep the other users secret.

For M integral values to be compared, their upper- and lower-limit values V_M and V_1 are determined in advance. In this case, $V_k > V_{k-1}$, where $k=2,3, \dots, M$. Incidentally, since the maximum and minimum values are specified by substantially the same method, the following description will be given only of the case of specifying the minimum value.

After determining his intended value V_{vi} equal to or greater than V_1 and equal to or smaller than V_M , each user $11-i$ (where $i=1,2, \dots, M$) generates in a user apparatus two M -element sequences of information s_i and t_i such that their elements corresponding to values equal to or greater than V_1 and equal to or smaller than V_{vi} are equal but other elements differ, and secretly sends the sequence of information s_i to a first quantitative competition apparatus and the sequence of information t_i to a second quantitative competition apparatus. With the sequence of information s_i or t_i alone, it is impossible to obtain information about the value V_{vi} , and hence there is no possibility of the value V_{vi} being available to any body and even to each quantitative competition apparatus.

After the sequences of information s_i and t_i (where $i=1,2, \dots, N$) about all users' intended values are obtained, the minimum value is determined. It can be determined by any desired procedure. An efficient scheme will be described below. For example, in the first place, initial values of two variables w_{\min} and w_{\max} are set at 1 and M , respectively, the maximum integer equal to or greater than $(w_{\min}+w_{\max})/2=(1+M)/2$ is set at w , and a check is made to see if there is a user whose intended value is equal to or smaller than V_w . To perform this, the first quantitative competition apparatus extracts w -th elements $s_{i,w}$ from all users' sequences of information s_i , and generates

$Seq_{s,w}=s_{1,w}|s_{2,w}|\dots|s_{N,w}$ (where $|$ indicates the concatenation of data) in which the extracted elements are arranged in a predetermined order (for example, in the order of numbers pre-assigned to the users). The second quantitative

- 5 information t_i , and generates $Seq_{t,w}=t_{1,w}|t_{2,w}|\dots|t_{N,w}$ in which the extracted elements are arranged in a predetermined order. Then, $Seq_{s,w}$ and $Seq_{t,w}$ are compared whether they are equal or not using one-way functions or encryption functions without revealing their values. If they differ from each other, it is decided that there is a user whose intended value is equal to or
- 10 smaller than V_w , then w is substituted for the variable w_{max} , then $Seq_{s,w}$ and $Seq_{t,w}$ are similarly generated, and they are compared. If they are equal to each other, it is decided that there is no user whose intended value is equal to or smaller than V_w , then $w+1$ is substituted for the variable w_{min} , and the above manipulation is repeated until $w_{min}=w_{max}$ ($=MIN$), by which the
- 15 minimum value V_{MIN} is determined.

When $w_{min}=w_{max}=MIN$ is reached, $Seq_{s,MIN}$ and $Seq_{t,MIN}$ are made public so that every body can specify the user whose intended value is the minimum value V_{MIN} .

20 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Fig. 1 is a diagram schematically illustrating an example of the entire system configuration of a first embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 2 is a block diagram showing examples of main functional configurations of a user apparatus;

- 25 Fig. 3 is a flowchart showing the procedure for generating two sequences of information;

Fig. 4 is a block diagram showing examples of main functional configurations of a quantitative competition apparatus 15A;

Fig. 5 is a block diagram showing examples of main functional configurations of a quantitative competition apparatus 15B;

Fig. 6 is a diagram schematically depicting two sequences of information of respective pairs;

Fig. 7 is a flowchart showing the procedure for specifying the minimum value;

Fig. 8 is a block diagram depicting the functional configuration of a user apparatus in a second embodiment of the present invention;

Fig. 9 is a block diagram depicting the functional configuration of an information sequence generating part 33 in Fig. 8; and

Fig. 10 is a flowchart showing the procedure that is followed by the user apparatus in the second embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

Assume that the upper- and lower-limit integral values V_M and V_L and a large prime P are already determined prior to quantitative competition. The prime number P is one that $P-1$ has a large prime factor as a divisor, that is, a prime that is used for a cryptosystem based on a discrete logarithm problem.

A description will be given of a first embodiment directed to a method with which it is possible to specify the lowest one of all bidders' intended values and the lowest bidder through use of two quantitative competition apparatuses, followed by a second embodiment that provides increased security in the above-mentioned quantitative competition method, and by a third embodiment that employs three quantitative competition apparatuses to ensure specifying the lowest one of all bidders' intended values and the lowest bidder even if one of the quantitative competition apparatuses goes down during operation.

First Embodiment

Fig. 1 illustrates in block form the entire system configuration of a first embodiment of the present invention, which comprises user apparatuses 13-1 to 13-N, quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B, a bulletin board apparatus 21 and a database 23. The user apparatuses 13-1 to 13-N are each capable of communicating with the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A, 15B and the bulletin board apparatus 21 through a communication network, and the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B are capable of communicating with the bulletin board apparatus 21. Reference character Y indicates information read out of the bulletin board apparatus 21, to which the database 23 is connected. A quantitative competition apparatus 15C surrounded by the broken line is used in a third embodiment described later on.

Each user apparatus 13-i comprises, as depicted in Fig. 2, an input part 30, a random generating part 31, a storage part 32, an information sequence generating part 33, an encrypting part 34, a hash function calculating part 35, a transmitting part 36, a control part 37, a concatenating part 38, and a sharing part 39.

Each user 11-i (where $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$) determines or chooses his or her aimed or intended integral value V_{vi} in the range from V_1 to V_M , and inputs the integral value to the user apparatus 13-i via the input part 30 such as a keyboard. The information sequence generating part 33 generates two sequences of information of the same number M of elements, $s_i = \{s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,M}\}$ and $t_i = \{t_{i,1}, t_{i,2}, \dots, t_{i,M}\}$ based on the input information V_{vi} and a random number generated by the random generating part 31. The number M is indicative of the value that the each user is allowed to choose as the intended value from among V_1 to V_M ; accordingly, a series of monotone increasing

values V_1 to V_M have a one-to-one correspondence with the numbers 1 to M .

On choosing the intended value V_{vi} , the user 11- i generates the two sequences of information s_i and t_i so that $s_{i,1}=t_{i,1}$, $s_{i,2}=t_{i,2}$, ..., $s_{i,vi-1}=t_{i,vi-1}$, $s_{i,vi} \neq t_{i,vi}$, $s_{i,vi+1} \neq t_{i,vi+1}$, ..., $s_{i,M} \neq t_{i,M}$. That is, s_i and t_i are generated so that the corresponding elements (information) in the range of from V_1 to V_{vi} are equal but that the corresponding elements in the range of from V_{vi} to V_M differ from each other.

Fig. 3 is a flowchart showing the procedure for generating such two sequences of information s_i and t_i .

Step S1: Generate $vi-1$ random numbers $r_1, r_2, \dots, r_{(vi-1)}$ each consisting of a predetermined number of bits, and divides these random numbers into two subsequences $s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,vi-1}$ and $t_{i,1}, t_{i,2}, \dots, t_{i,vi-1}$ where $s_{i,m}=t_{i,m}$, $m=1, 2, \dots, vi-1$.

Step S2: Let m be vi .

Step S3: Generate two random numbers r_s and r_t .

Step S4: Compare the two random numbers, and if they are equal, then return to step S3.

Step S5: If the two random numbers differ from each other, set r_s at $s_{i,m}$ and r_t at $t_{i,m}$ and increment m by one.

Step S6: If m is smaller than M , then return of step S3.

Step S7: If m is not smaller than M in step S6, then concatenate the above-mentioned two subsequences $s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,vi-1}$ and $t_{i,1}, t_{i,2}, \dots, t_{i,vi-1}$ with $s_{i,vi}, s_{i,vi+1}, \dots, s_{i,M}$ and $t_{i,vi}, t_{i,vi+1}, \dots, t_{i,M}$ set by repeating steps S3 to S5, thereby obtaining two sequences of information $s_i = \{s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,M}\}$ and $t_i = \{t_{i,1}, t_{i,2}, \dots, t_{i,M}\}$. The two sequences of information thus obtained are stored in the storage part 32 in Fig. 2.

The random generating part 31 generates random numbers $R1_i$ and $R2_i$, and pairs of information $(s_i, R1_i)$ and $(t_i, R2_i)$ are sent secretly to the

quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B, respectively; for example, the pairs of information are encrypted with encryption functions E_A and E_B in the encrypting part 34 into encrypted sequences of information $E_A(s_i||R1_i)$ and $E_B(t_i||R2_i)$ for transmission to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B. The encryption functions E_A and E_B are public-key cryptofunctions that only the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B can decrypt, respectively. Further, the random generator 31 generates a random number r_i as data that is used to verify the fairness of the minimum intended value V_{MIN} described later on, and the concatenating part 38 generates $V_{vi}||r_i$ that is a concatenation of the intended value V_{vi} and the random number r_i ; furthermore, the sharing part 39 determines random information a_i and b_i such that $r_i = a_i * b_i$ (where $*$ is an operator made public in advance). The operator $*$ may be any operators that uniquely define the random number r_i when the pieces of random information a_i and b_i are given, such as exclusive OR, subtraction, addition and so forth.

The hash function calculating part 35 calculates, by a hash function h , hash values $H1 = h(s_i||R1_i)$ and $H2 = h(t_i||R2_i)$ for concatenations of the respective sequences of information and the random numbers, $s_i||R1_i$ and $t_i||R2_i$. The hash function calculating part 35 further calculates hash values $h(a_i)$, $h(b_i)$ and $h(V_{vi}||r_i)$ of a_i , b_i and $V_{vi}||r_i$, and sends all of these values to the bulletin board apparatus 21. Incidentally, the minimum and maximum values V_1 and V_M , the two sequences of information s_i and t_i , the random numbers $R1_i$ and $R2_i$, the intended value V_{vi} , the random number r_i and the random information a_i and b_i are stored in the storage part 32, from which they are sent by the transmitting part 36 to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A, 15B and the bulletin board apparatus 21. The control part 37 controls reading from or writing to the storage part 32 and operations of the respective parts. The user apparatus 13-i may also be configured to

execute programs by a computer.

Each user apparatus 13-i commits the intended value V_{vi} by sending the hash values $h(V_{vi}||r_i)$, $H1_i$ and $H2_i$ to the bulletin board apparatus 21 for publication as mentioned above. This means that each user registers V_{vi} as his intended value without making it public. As a result, the intended value V_{vi} is made unchangeable thereafter, and when a value equal to or larger than the intended value V_{vi} is made public as the minimum value V_{MIN} in the bulletin board apparatus 21 for some reason, each user apparatus makes public the pairs of information $(s_i, R1_i)$ and $(t_i, R2_i)$, or $(V_{vi}||r_i)$ to indicate that the intended value V_{vi} is equal to or smaller than the minimum value V_{MIN} , thereby verifying that the published minimum value V_{MIN} is cheating. It is for the reasons given below not to singly hash the information sequences s_i and t_i to be sent to the bulletin board apparatus 21 but instead to hash their concatenations with the random numbers $R1_i$ and $R2_i$. That is, letting $H1_i=h(s_i)$ and $H2_i=h(t_i)$, if the number of bits of each element of the information sequences s_i and t_i are decreased for the purpose of reducing channel capacity and another user learns either one of the sequences of information s_i and t_i by some means, then the user could easily estimate the other information sequence (the knowledge of s_i and t_i may enable the user to know the value V_{vi}); therefore, the above scheme is intended to prevent such leakage of the information sequences and hence provide increased security for the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B. In practice, however, the security may be diminished to some extent, and if the number of bits of each element is large, the random numbers $R1_i$ and $R2_i$ may be omitted.

The quantitative competition apparatuses 15A (and 15B) comprise, as shown in Fig. 4 (and Fig. 5), receiving parts 40A (40B), decrypting parts 37A (47B), storage parts 41A (41B), random generating parts 42A (42B), hash function calculating parts 43A (43B), modular exponentiation parts 44A (44B),

transmitting parts 45A (45B), and control parts 46A (46B).

In the quantitative competition apparatus 15A the encrypted sequence of information $E_A(s_i||R1_i)$ received in the receiving part 40A is decrypted in the decrypting part 47A into $s_i||R1_i$ (where $i=1, \dots, N$), and if necessary, the decrypted information $s_i||R1_i$ is hashed in the hash function calculating part 43A to obtain a hash value $h(s_i||R1_i)$; it is possible to verify that the hash value matches the value $H1_i$ made public in the bulletin board apparatus 21. The sequences of information s_1 to s_N and the random numbers $R1_1$ to $R1_n$ are separated from the value $s_i||R1_i$ and are stored in the storage part 41A. In the storage part 41A there is also prestored the afore-mentioned large prime P.

The bulletin board apparatus 21 stores information received from the user apparatuses 13-1 to 13-N and the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B in the data base 23, which is accessible from any apparatuses. In the quantitative competition processing the bulletin board apparatus 21 decides whether the pieces of information sent from the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B match each other, and based on the result of decision, updates the value w to be provided to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B. Since the bulletin board apparatus 21 performs only such functions, their functional configurations are not shown.

Upon completion of transmission of the encrypted sequences of information $E_A(s_i||R1_i)$ and $E_B(s_i||R1_i)$ and the hash values $H1_i$, $H2_i$, $h(V_{vi}||r_i)$, $h(a_i)$ and $h(b_i)$ from every user 13- i (where $i=1, \dots, N$), for example, the bulletin board apparatus 21 sends to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B an initial value V_w that is the maximum integer equal to or larger than $(w_{\min}+w_{\max})/2=(1+M)/2$ where w_{\min} and w_{\max} are two integral variables and have their initial values set at 1 to M , respectively, the initial value V_w being received in the receiving parts 40A and 40B. The quantitative competition apparatus 15A generates, as depicted in Fig. 4, a

random number RA_w in the random generating part 42A, then reads out of the storage part 41A those elements $s_{i,w}$ in the sequences of information s_i received from all the user apparatuses 13 which correspond to the value w , and generates, by a sequence generator 48A, $Seq_{s,w}=s_{1,w}||s_{2,w}||\dots||s_{N,w}$, which is a concatenation of the read-out elements arranged in the order of the users 11-1, 11-2, ..., 11-N. The hash function calculating part 43A calculates a hash value $HS_w=h'(Seq_{s,w})$ for the element concatenation $Seq_{s,w}$ by a hash function h' and a hash value $HA_w=h(RA_w||HS_w)$, by a hash function h , for a concatenation $RA_w||HS_w$ of the random number RA_w and the hash value HS_w produced by a concatenator 49A. The hash value HS_w and the random number RA_w are input to the modular exponentiation part 44A for calculating $CA_w=HS_w^{RA_w} \pmod{P}$, and a pair (HA_w, CA_w) is sent from the transmitting part 45A to the bulletin board apparatus 21, wherein it is made public. The hash function h' is a one-way function that maps a given value over a finite field uniquely and randomly. The hash function h is a general-purpose function like SHA-1.

The quantitative competition apparatus 15B generates, as depicted in Fig. 5, a random number RB_w in the random generating part 42B, then reads out of the storage part 41B those elements $t_{i,w}$ in the sequences of information t_i received from all the user apparatuses 13 which correspond to the value w , and generates, by a sequence generator 48B, $Seq_{t,w}=t_{1,w}||t_{2,w}||\dots||t_{N,w}$, which is a concatenation of the read-out elements arranged in the order of the users 11-1, 11-2, ..., 11-N. The hash function calculating part 43B calculates a hash value $HT_w=h'(Seq_{t,w})$ for the element concatenation $Seq_{t,w}$ by a hash function h' and a hash value $HB_w=h(RB_w||HT_w)$, by a hash function h , for a concatenation $RB_w||HT_w$ of the random number RB_w and the hash value HT_w produced by a concatenator 49B. The hash value HT_w and the random number RB_w are input to the modular exponentiation part 44B for calculating

$CB_w = HT_w^{RBw} \pmod{P}$, and a pair of values (HB_w, CB_w) is sent from the transmitting part 45B to the bulletin board apparatus 21, wherein it is made public.

Next, the quantitative competition apparatus 15A reads the information CB_w made public by the bulletin board apparatus 21, then inputs it to the modular exponentiation part 44A, then calculates CB_w^{RAw} by the random number RA_w , and sends the calculation result to the bulletin board apparatus 21. Similarly, the quantitative competition apparatus 15B also reads $CA_w = HS_w^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ made public by the bulletin board apparatus 21, then inputs it to the modular exponentiation part 44B to calculate $CA_w^{RBw} = (HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$, and sends the result of calculation to the bulletin board apparatus 21.

Fig. 6 schematically shows in vertical form the sequences of information s_i and t_i (where $i=1, \dots, N$) that each user apparatus 13-i generates in the information sequence generating part 33. In a given pair $(s_{i,m}, t_{i,m})$ of the corresponding elements in each pair of sequences of information $s_i = \{s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,m}, \dots, s_{i,M}\}$ and $t_i = \{t_{i,1}, t_{i,2}, \dots, t_{i,m}, \dots, t_{i,M}\}$, the straight-line portions represent subsequences where $s_{i,m} = t_{i,m}$, and the zigzag portions represent subsequences where $s_{i,m} \neq t_{i,m}$. For example, when the value $m=w$ passes through the straight-line portions of all pairs of sequences of information s_i and t_i as shown, $(s_{i,w} || s_{2,w} || \dots || s_{N,w}) = (t_{i,w} || t_{2,w} || \dots || t_{N,w})$, that is, $Seq_{s,w} = Seq_{t,w}$, and consequently, it can be seen that $h'(Seq_{s,w}) = h'(Seq_{t,w})$, that is, $HS_w = HT_w$. However, if the value w is high enough to pass through the zigzag portions of at least one pair of sequences of information s_i and t_i , the likelihood of $HS_w = HT_w$ is negligibly little since $(s_{i,w} || s_{2,w} || \dots || s_{N,w}) \neq (t_{i,w} || t_{2,w} || \dots || t_{N,w})$. Accordingly, $HS_w \neq HT_w$.

When $HS_w = HT_w$, the values $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ sent to the bulletin board apparatus 21 are equal to each

other. Since P is a large prime and since $P-1$ has a large prime factor as its divisor, the likelihood of the values $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ being equal is negligibly little when $HS_w \neq HT_w$. Accordingly, when $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P} = (HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$, since $s_{1,w} = t_{1,w}$, $s_{2,w} = t_{2,w}$, ..., $s_{N,w} = t_{N,w}$, it holds that $s_{i,m} = t_{i,m}$ (where $m=1, \dots, w$) for each i and the intended value V_{vi} is not included in first to w -th values V_1 to V_w among M values V_1 to V_M ; therefore, the minimum intended value V_{MIN} is not included. In other words, the minimum intended value is present in the range of $(w+1)$ -th to M -th values. It can be seen that when $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P} \neq (HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$, the probability of the minimum intended value being present in the w -th and subsequent values is overwhelmingly high.

The bulletin board apparatus 21 makes the above comparison, then substitutes $w+1$ for the variable w_{min} or w for the variable w_{max} depending on whether $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ are equal or not, and repeats the above manipulation. After approximately $\log M$ rounds of manipulation, $w_{max} = w_{min}$ ($=MIN$). In this instance, the MIN -th value V_{MIN} in the range from V_1 to V_M is the minimum intended value.

Fig. 7 shows the procedure of searching for the minimum value described above.

Step S1: The bulletin board apparatus 21 initializes the variables w_{min} and w_{max} at 1 and M , respectively, then calculates the maximum integer w equal to or smaller than $(w_{min} + w_{max})/2$, and sends the value w to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B.

Step S2A: The quantitative competition apparatus 15A generates the element concatenation $Seq_{s,w}$ and the random number RA_w , then calculates the hash values $HS_w = h'(Seq_{s,w})$ and $HA_w = h(RA_w || HS_w)$ and the modular exponent $CA_w = HS_w^{RAw} \pmod{P}$, and sends (HA_w, CA_w) to the bulletin board apparatus

21.

Step S2B: Similarly, the quantitative competition apparatus 15B also generates the element concatenation $Seq_{l,w}$ and the random number RB_w , then calculates the hash values $HT_w = h'(Seq_{l,w})$ and $HB_w = h(RB_w || HT_w)$ and the modular exponent $CB_w = HT_w^{RB_w} \pmod{P}$, and sends (HB_w, CB_w) to the bulletin board apparatus 21.

Step S3A: The quantitative competition apparatus 15A reads out CB_w from the bulletin board apparatus 21, then calculates $CB_w^{RA_w} \pmod{P} = (HT_w^{RB_w})^{RA_w} \pmod{P}$, and sends it to the bulletin board apparatus 21.

Step S3B: The quantitative competition apparatus 15B reads out CA_w from the bulletin board apparatus 21, then calculates $CA_w^{RB_w} \pmod{P} = (HS_w^{RA_w})^{RB_w} \pmod{P}$, and sends it to the bulletin board apparatus 21.

Step S4: The bulletin board apparatus 21 makes a check to determine if $(HT_w^{RB_w})^{RA_w} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RA_w})^{RB_w} \pmod{P}$ match each other.

Step S5: If they match, the bulletin board apparatus 21 substitutes w_{min} for $w_w + 1$.

Step S6: If they do not match, the bulletin board apparatus 21 substitutes w_{max} for w_w .

Step S7: A check is made to see if $w_{max} = w_{min}$, and if not, the procedure returns to step S1, followed by repeating steps S2A, S2B, S3A, S3B, S4, S5 and S6.

Step S8: If w_{max} and w_{min} are equal in step S7, then $w_{min} = MIN$ and the value corresponding to the number MIN , as the minimum intended value V_{min} , are both made public. The quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B send to the bulletin board apparatus 21 the element concatenations $Seq_{s,MIN}$ and $Seq_{l,MIN}$ corresponding to the number MIN , thereby making it

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possible to specify a user 11-j that the corresponding elements $s_{j,\text{MIN}}$ and $t_{j,\text{MIN}}$ in the two element concatenations differ from each other.

This means that the minimum intended value V_{MIN} among the intended values V_{v_1} to V_{v_N} of the users 11-1 to 11-N has been obtained.

- 5 After detecting the minimum intended value V_{MIN} the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B send to the bulletin board apparatus 21 $\text{Seq}_{s,\text{MIN}}$, RA_{MIN} , $\text{Seq}_{t,\text{MIN}}$ and RB_{MIN} obtained when $w_{\text{min}}=w_{\text{max}}=\text{MIN}$. As a result, all the users 11-1 to 11-N are allowed to compare the corresponding elements $s_{i,\text{MIN}}$ and $t_{i,\text{MIN}}$ of the two element concatenations $\text{Seq}_{s,\text{MIN}}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,\text{MIN}}$ for each $i=1, \dots, N$ and learn that the user 11-j corresponding to the j-th portion containing information $s_{j,\text{MIN}} \neq t_{j,\text{MIN}}$ has set the minimum intended value V_{MIN} as his intended value V_{v_j} . With the order of arrangement of $\text{Seq}_{s,\text{MIN}}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,\text{MIN}}$ known, it is possible to specify the above-mentioned j-th user 11-j determined in step S8.

- 15 In this embodiment the quantitative competition apparatus 15A receives from the user 11-i (where $i=1, \dots, N$) the random information a_i that is $r_i=a_i*b_i$, whereas the quantitative competition apparatus 15B receives the random information b_i from the user 11-i. The bulletin board apparatus 21 receives $h(a_i)$, $h(b_i)$ and $h(V_{v_i}||r_i)$ from each user 11-i. Accordingly, if the .
- 20 quantitative competition apparatus 15A happens to know the random number r_i for every user prior to the search for the minimum intended value V_{MIN} , $V_w=V_{v_i}$ that matches $h(V_{v_i}||r_i)$ made public can be found out by calculating $h(V_w||r_i)$ sequentially from V_1 to V_M for each i , and consequently, the quantitative competition apparatus 15B detects the minimum intended value
- 25 V_{MIN} before the bulletin board apparatus 21 begins to search for the value V_{MIN} --this is undesirable from viewpoint of security. In the first embodiment, however, since the pieces of random information a_i and b_i that $r_i=a_i*b_i$ are provided separately to the quantitative competition apparatuses

15A and 15B, neither of them can singly search for the value V_{MIN} .

After the detection of the minimum intended value V_{MIN} the validity of the value made public in the bulletin board apparatus 21 can be verified as described below.

5 The values $h(a_j)$, $h(b_j)$ and $h(V_{vj}||r_j)$ of the user 11-j are already made public. The quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B respectively send the random information a_j and b_j to the bulletin board apparatus 21, in which they are made public. Each user apparatus 13-i uses the published values $V_{vj}=V_{MIN}$ to calculate $h(V_{MIN}||a_j*b_j)$ and verifies whether

10 $h(V_{MIN}||a_j*b_j)=h(V_{vj}||r_j)$. A mismatch means that the user 11-j, or the quantitative competition apparatus 15A or 15B has cheated. Then, the values $h(a_j)$ and $h(b_j)$ are calculated from a_j and b_j , and a check is made to determine whether they match the published values. If a mismatch is found,

15 it can be decided that the quantitative competition apparatus has cheated which sent that one of the pieces of random information a_j and b_j which does not match the corresponding value. If the both values match the published values, it can be decided that the user 11-j having sent the published value $h(V_{vj}||r_j)$ has cheated.

As described above, by determining the random information a_i and b_i

20 such that $r_i=a_i*b_i$ and keeping $h(a_i)$, $h(b_i)$ and $h(V_{vi}||r_i)$ public in the bulletin board apparatus 21, each user can verify the validity of the random information a_j , b_j sent from the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B to the bulletin board apparatus 21. This produces the same effect as is obtainable in the case where the user 11-i attaches his signature to the random

25 information a_i , b_i to guarantee their validity as long as it is proved that the verification information $h(a_i)$, $h(b_i)$ made public by the bulletin board apparatus 21 is about the user 11-i; furthermore, this scheme has advantages that the computational complexity involved is less than in the case of using

the signature scheme and that the user does not require any signature means. Incidentally, it is desired in terms of security the random number r_i be sufficiently large.

In the first embodiment, a person who knows HT_w may estimate HS_w , and if it is correct, he can detect another user's intended value, but since P is a large prime and since $P-1$ has large prime factor as its divisor, it is difficult to calculate RA_w of $HS_w^{RA_w} \bmod P$; hence, it is impossible to determine whether the estimated value HS_w is truly correct. Accordingly, every user cannot find out any other user's intended value.

By making RA_{MIN} and RB_{MIN} public at last and using them and the element concatenations $Seq_{s,MIN}$ and $Seq_{t,MIN}$, it can be verified whether fair quantitative competitions have been made.

In the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B, reading from and writing to the storage parts 41A and 41B, processing of received information, transmission of various information via the transmitting parts 45A and 45B to respective apparatuses and the operations of the respective parts are laced under the control of the control parts 46A and 46B. The quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B can also be functioned through executions of programs by a computer.

Though its functional configuration is not shown in particular, the bulletin board apparatus 21 is provided with a transmitting-receiving part for communication with each user apparatus and the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B, and stores received information in the database (Fig. 1). When requested, the bulletin board apparatus 21 reads out the requested information from the database 23 for transmission to the apparatus having made the request; furthermore, the apparatus 21 transmits and receives information necessary for the procedure of Fig. 7 and for its execution. The bulletin board apparatus 21 can also be functioned through execution of

programs by a computer.

The first embodiment has been described above to determine the minimum value V_{MIN} among all users' intended values V_{vi} with the numbers 1 to M made to correspond with the values V_1 to V_M in ascending order, but by making the numbers 1 to M correspond with the values V_1 to V_M in descending order, the maximum value V_{MAX} among all of the intended values V_i can also be determined using the above-described algorithm intact. That is, letting vi represent the number corresponding to the intended value V_{vi} , the two sequences of information s_i and t_i need only to be generated so that, for the numbers 1 to M, $s_{i,w}=t_{i,w}$ or $s_{i,w}\neq t_{i,w}$ depending on whether the number element w is equal to or greater than 1 but smaller than vi or equal to or greater than vi but smaller than M. In short, only by arranging the values V_1 to V_M upside down in Fig. 6, it can be seen that the determination of the number MIN which provides the minimum intended value V_{MIN} is the same as the determination of the number MAX which provides the maximum intended value V_{MAX} . That is, in the first embodiment described above, if the order of numbering the values V_1 to V_M is reversed to M to 1 and the number MIN is replaced with the number MAX, Fig. 7 will be the quantitative competition procedure of searching for the maximum intended value V_{MAX} . This applies to the embodiments described later on.

Second Embodiment

In the above-described first embodiment, if a certain user 11-i conspires with either one of the two quantitative competition apparatuses, the user 11-i, though having committed the intended value V_{vi} , could secretly abandon the game (withdrawal of his bidding). The abandonment of the game mentioned herein means that the user 11-i will not be determined to have committed the minimum V_{MIN} (will not be a winning bidder) regardless

of his committed intended value V_{vi} , that is, irrespective of whether the value V_{vi} is the minimum among all the users' intended values $V_{v1}, V_{v2}, \dots, V_{vN}$.

For example, in the case where the user 11-i conspires with the quantitative competition apparatus 15B and, each time supplied with w from the bulletin board apparatus 21, embeds not the sequence element $t_{i,w}$ of the user 11-i but the value of the sequence element $s_{i,w}$ from the user 11-i in the element concatenation $Seq_{t,w}$ in step S2B of the Fig. 7 quantitative competition procedure to thereby alter the sequence $s_{i,w} \neq t_{i,w}$ to $s_{i,w} = t_{i,w}$, even if the intended value V_{vi} of the user 11-i is the minimum value V_{MIN} , the user 11-i will not be determined to have committed the minimum value V_{MIN} in the search for the minimum value by the bulletin board apparatus 21 but instead any one of the other users will be determined to have committed the minimum value V_{MIN} . Such a determination cannot be said to be fair. Since the afore-mentioned fairness verification scheme verifies $h(V_{vj}||r_j)$ and $h(a_j||b_j)$ only for the intended value V_{vj} determined as the minimum value V_{MIN} and published and the user 11-j, it is impossible to detect the cheat by a conspiracy between the user 11-i and the quantitative competition apparatus 15B.

A description will be given below of a second embodiment adapted to prevent a cheat by such a conspiracy between a user and a quantitative competition apparatus.

The second embodiment features the method for generating the sequences of information s_i and t_i of each user 11-i in the first embodiment. In this embodiment, an m -th element of each of the M -element sequences $s_i = \{s_{i,1}, \dots, s_{i,M}\}$ and $t_i = \{t_{i,1}, \dots, t_{i,M}\}$ is generated based on information about all elements preceding the m -th element. Accordingly, in the case of the sequence $s_{i,1}, \dots, s_{i,M}$, if the m -th element $s_{i,m}$ is replaced with $t_{i,m}$ or some other value $s'_{i,m}$, the element $s'_{i,m}$ is not based on the information about the elements $s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s'_{i,m}, \dots, s_{i,M}$ preceding it, and the subsequent elements

$s_{i,m+1}, \dots, s_{i,M}$ are not based on the elements preceding the element $s_{i,m}$, either, and consequently, such a malicious replacement can be detected. The second embodiment will be described below concretely.

Fig. 8 illustrates in block form the configuration of the user apparatus 13-i adapted for the quantitative competition according to the second embodiment. In this embodiment the concatenating part 38 and the sharing part 39 in the Fig. 2 configuration are removed and the information sequence generating part 33 has such a configuration as depicted in Fig. 9. The random generating part 31 generates, as in the Fig. 2 embodiment, the random numbers $R1_i$ and $R2_i$, and further generates initial random numbers $s_{i,M+1}$, $t_{i,M+1}$, ca_i and cb_i . Based on these initial random numbers, the information sequence generating part 33 generates $s_{i,M}, s_{i,M-1}, \dots, s_{i,1}, s_{i,0}$ and $t_{i,M}, t_{i,M-1}, \dots, t_{i,1}$ in a sequential order.

Fig. 9 shows an example of the configuration of the information sequence generating part 33, which is shown to comprise hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B, concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, hash calculators 33-3A and 33-3B, and a concatenator 33-4. The hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B are supplied with the initial random numbers ca_i and cb_i , respectively, then calculate their hash values $h(ca_i)$ and $h(cb_i)$, and in the next and subsequent rounds of calculation repeats calculating hash values of the calculation results each time. The concatenator 33-2A concatenates the past sequence of information s_i of the preceding rounds of calculation with the current outputs from the hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B. The concatenator 33-2B concatenates the sequence of information t_i of the preceding rounds of calculation with the current outputs from the hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B. The hash calculators 33-3A and 33-3B calculate hash values of the outputs from the concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, respectively, and output the hash values as the current sequence elements $s_{i,m}$ and $t_{i,m}$. The outputs from

the hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B, which are input to the concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B for an m -th round of hash calculation by the hash calculators 33-3A and 33-3B, are the outputs by an $(m+1)$ -th round of hash calculation.

In the process for generating the subsequences $s_{i,m}$ and $t_{i,m}$ that are not equal, the initial random numbers $s_{i,M+1}$ and $t_{i,M+1}$ are input as initial values of the sequences of information s_i and t_i to the concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, then the first-round outputs from the hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B are input to the both concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, and the hash values output from these concatenators are provided as sequences s_i and t_i of information of the second and subsequent rounds of calculation to the concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B.

Upon completion of the generation of the subsequences from $m=M$ to $m=v$, the output $s_{i,vi}||t_{i,vi}$ from the concatenator 33-4 for $m=vi-1$ corresponding to the intended value V_{vi} is input as the sequences of information s_i and t_i to the concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, respectively, and the concatenated outputs are provided to the hash calculators 33-3A and 33-3B for calculating their hash values. In this process, since the same sequence of information $s_{i,vi}||t_{i,vi}$ as the outputs from the hash calculators 33-1A and 33-1B are provided to the both concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, the outputs $s_{i,m}$ and $t_{i,m}$ from the hash calculators 33-3A and 33-3B for $m=vi-1$ are equal to each other.

Thereafter, the outputs $s_{i,m}$ and $t_{i,m}$ from the hash calculators 33-3A and 33-3B are input again as sequences of information to the concatenators 33-2A and 33-2B, and hash calculations are repeated sequentially for $m=vi-2, vi-3, \dots, 0$, by which the subsequence $s_{i,m}=t_{i,m}$ is generated.

Fig. 10 is a flowchart of the procedure to be followed by the user apparatus 13-i in the second embodiment.

Step S1: Generate the initial random numbers $R1_i, R2_i, ca_i, cb_i, s_{i,M+1}$

and $t_{i,M+1}$.

Step S2: Set an initial value m at M , then sequentially calculate, for the element number vi corresponding to the intended value vi ,

$$s_{i,m} = h(s_{i,m+1} || h^{M+1-m}(ca_i) || h^{M+1-m}(cb_i))$$

$$5 \quad t_{i,m} = h(t_{i,m+1} || h^{M+1-m}(ca_i) || h^{M+1-m}(cb_i))$$

for $m=M, M-1, \dots, vi$, and store the calculation results as subsequences

$$s_{i,m} \neq t_{i,m}.$$

Step S3: Calculate

$$s_{i,m} = t_{i,m} = h(s_{i,m+1} || t_{i,m+1} || h^{M+1-m}(ca_i) || h^{M+1-m}(cb_i))$$

10 for $m=vi-1$ and store it.

Step S4: Calculate

$$s_{i,m} = t_{i,m} = h(s_{i,m+1} || h^{M+1-m}(ca_i) || h^{M+1-m}(cb_i))$$

sequentially for $m=vi-2, vi-3, \dots, 0$ and store it as subsequences $s_{i,m}=t_{i,m}$.

Step S5: Encrypt $R1_i$ and $s_i=\{s_{i,1}, s_{i,2}, \dots, s_{i,M}\}$, then send the resulting

15 $E_A(s_i || R1_i)$ to the quantitative competition apparatus 15A, then encrypt $R2_i$ and $t_i=\{t_{i,1}, t_{i,2}, \dots, t_{i,M}\}$, and send the resulting $E_B(t_i || R1_i)$ to the quantitative competition apparatus 15B.

Step S6: Send $H1_i=h(s_i || R1_i)$, $H2_i=h(t_i || R2_i)$, $s_{i,0}$, $h^{M+1}(ca_i)$ and $h^{M+1}(cb_i)$ to the bulletin board apparatus 21 for publication.

20 The quantitative competition processing, that is, the processing of searching for the minimum intended value V_{MIN} , by the bulletin board apparatus 21 and the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B is the same as described previously with reference to Fig. 7.

After specifying the minimum value V_{MIN} , the bulletin board
25 apparatus 21 calculates the hash values $h(ca_i)$ and $h(cb_i)$ from the user apparatus 13-i ($M+1-MIN$) times to obtain $h^{M+1-MIN}(ca_i)$ and $h^{M+1-MIN}(cb_i)$ (where $i=1,2, \dots, N$), which are made public. The validity of these values is guaranteed by verifying whether the values obtained by further calculating

them MIN times match the published information $h^{M+1}(ca_i)$ and $h^{M+1}(cb_i)$. Moreover, since $s_{i,MIN}$, $t_{i,MIN}$, $h^{M+1-MIN}(ca_i)$ and $h^{M+1-MIN}(cb_i)$ of each user are made public by a winner (successful bidder) specifying phase, any user can equally calculate $s_{i,0}$ by executing step S4 through utilization of the published information.

If the user 11-i and the quantitative competition apparatus 15A or 15B conspire to replace $s_{i,w}$ and $t_{i,w}$ for $s_{i,MIN}$ and $t_{i,MIN}$ as described previously, a value different from $s_{i,0}$ is usually calculated. In other words, the replacement is detected. But this verification is inefficient on the order of MN that is the product of the choosable number M of intended values and the number N of users. However, since the primary object is to determine the winner and his intended value, this "fairness verification phase" of the loser is not essential, and in practice it needs only to be performed after completion of the protocol.

Third Embodiment

In the first and second embodiments two quantitative competition apparatuses and each user apparatus generates two sequences of information s_i and t_i . This embodiment uses three quantitative competition apparatuses, including the third quantitative competition apparatus 15C surrounded by the broken line in Fig. 1. Each user generates three sequences of information s_i , t_i and u_i in the same manner as in the afore-described embodiments such that $s_{i,m}=t_{i,m}=u_{i,m}$ for $m=1, 2, \dots, v_i-1$ and $s_{i,m} \neq t_{i,m} \neq u_{i,m}$ for $m=v_i, v_i+1, \dots, M$ where v_i corresponds to the intended value V_{v_i} , and secretly sends each of them to one of the three quantitative competition apparatuses, and as is the case with the first embodiment, the quantitative competition processing is carried out by two quantitative competition apparatus and the bulletin board apparatus. In this instance, when one of the two quantitative competition apparatuses goes

down, the third quantitative competition apparatus carries on the processing of the failing apparatus. This embodiment is identical in basic operation with the first embodiment, and hence it will be described with reference to the drawings showing the first embodiment.

5 The user 13-i (where $i=1,2, \dots, N$) determines the intended integral value V_{vi} equal to or greater than V_1 and equal to or smaller than V_M , and generates, by the information sequence generating part 33 in the user apparatus 13-i of Fig. 2, three sequences of information s_i , t_i and u_i such that
10 pieces of information corresponding to the values in the range from V_1 to V_{vi-1} are all equal but pieces of information corresponding to the values in the range from V_{vi} to V_M are all different. Further, the user generates random numbers $R1_i$, $R2_i$, $R3_i$ and r_i in the random generating part 31, and determines random information a_i , b_i and c_i such that $r_i=a_i*b_i*c_i$. A pair of information
15 (s_i , $R1_i$) and the information a_i , a pair of information (t_i , $R2_i$) and the information b_i , and a pair of information (u_i , $R3_i$) and the information c_i are sent secretly (in encrypted form) to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A, 15B and 15C, respectively. Moreover, hash values $H1_i=h(s_i||R1_i)$, $H2_i=h(t_i||R2_i)$ and $H3_i=h(u_i||R3_i)$ of concatenations $s_i||R1_i$, $t_i||R2_i$ and $u_i||R3_i$ of the respective pairs are calculated using the hash function h ; hash values $h(a_i)$,
20 $h(b_i)$ and $h(c_i)$ of the random information and a hash value $h(V_i||r_i)$ of the intended value V_{vi} and the random number r_i are calculated; and hash values $h(a_i)$, $h(b_i)$ and $h(c_i)$ of the random information and a hash value $h(V_i||r_i)$ of the intended value V_{vi} and the random number r_i are calculated. These hash values are sent to the bulletin board apparatus 21, wherein they are made
25 public.

Each user 11-i commits the value V_{vi} by sending the hash values $H1_i$, $H2_i$, $H3_i$ and $h(V_i||r_i)$ to the bulletin board apparatus 21 and making them public. As a result, the intended value is no longer changeable, and if a

value larger than the intended value V_{vi} is determined to be the minimum value for some reason, the user can prove, by making public at least two of three pairs of information $(s_i, R1_i)$, $(t_i, R2_i)$ and $(u_i, R3_i)$, that his intended value is qualified as the minimum value. Assume that the random number r_i can be calculated when two of three pairs of information are known.

Since the subsequent quantitative competition processing can be performed by the bulletin board apparatus 21 and two quantitative competition apparatuses as described previously with reference to the first embodiment, the Fig. 7 procedure is followed using two quantitative competition apparatuses, for example, 15A and 15B.

That is, the bulletin board apparatus 21 first sends the maximum integer w equal to or smaller than $(w_{\min} + w_{\max})/2 = (1 + M)/2$ as an initial value to the both quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B. The quantitative competition apparatus 15A generates a random number RA_w , then extracts elements $s_{i,w}$ of the s_i -sequences of information received from all user apparatuses, and generates an element concatenation $Seq_{s,w} = s_{1,w} || s_{2,w} || \dots || s_{N,w}$ such that the extracted elements are arranged in the order of users 11-1, 11-2, ..., 11-N. Further, the quantitative competition apparatus 15A calculates a hash value $HS_w = h'(Seq_{s,w})$ by the hash function h' , a hash value $HA_w = h(RA_w || HS_w)$ by the hash function h , and a modular exponent $CA_w = HS_w^{RA_w} \pmod{P}$, and sends a pair of information (HA_w, CA_w) to the bulletin board 21. The quantitative competition apparatus 15B generates a random number RB_w , then extracts elements $t_{i,w}$ of t_i -sequences of information received from all the user apparatuses, then generates an element concatenation $Seq_{t,w} = t_{1,w} || t_{2,w} || \dots || t_{N,w}$ such that the extracted elements are arranged in the order of users 11-1, 11-2, ..., 11-N, then calculates a hash value $HT_w = h'(Seq_{t,w})$ by the hash function h' , a hash value $HB_w = h(RB_w || HT_w)$ by the hash function h , and a modular exponent $CB_w = HT_w^{RB_w} \pmod{P}$, and

sends a pair of information (HB_w, CB_w) to the bulletin board 21.

Next, the quantitative competition apparatus 15A reads the modular exponent $CB_w = HT_w^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ made public by the bulletin board apparatus 21, then calculates $CB_w^{RAw} \pmod{P} = (HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$, and sends it to the bulletin board apparatus 21. The quantitative competition apparatus 15B reads the modular exponent $CA_w = HS_w^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ made public by the bulletin board apparatus 21, then calculates $CA_w^{RBw} \pmod{P} = (HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$, and sends it to the bulletin board apparatus 21.

If HS_w and HT_w are equal, then $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ are equal, and since P is a large prime and $P-1$ has a large prime factor as its divisor, there is little possibility that HS_w and HT_w differ and $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ become equal. Accordingly, it can be seen that when $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \pmod{P}$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \pmod{P}$ are equal, the minimum intended value V_{MIN} is equal to or greater than V_{w+1} , whereas when they differ, the value V_{MIN} is equal to or smaller than V_w . If they are equal, $w+1$ is substituted for the variable w_{min} , and if they differ, w is substituted for the variable w_{max} , after which the above manipulation is repeated. By repeating the manipulation about $\log M$ times, $w_{max} = w_{min} (= MIN)$ is obtained. The value V_{MIN} thus obtained is the minimum intended value. In the following description, MIN will be used as the element number corresponding to V_{MIN} in the sequences of information s_i and t_i as in the case of Fig. 6.

After detecting the minimum intended value V_{MIN} , the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A, 15B and 15C send a_j , $Seq_{s,MIN}$ and RA_{MIN} , b_j , $Seq_{t,MIN}$ and RB_{MIN} , and only c_j , respectively, to the bulletin board apparatus 21, y which they are made public. By this, all the users can detect that the user corresponding to that common position of the two sequences holding different pieces of information is the user 11-j having committed V_{MIN} as his

intended value.

Suppose, for example, that the quantitative competition apparatus 15B goes down in the above process. Since the information possessed by the quantitative competition apparatus 15B and the information by the quantitative apparatus 15C are essentially identical, the latter can take over the operation of the former.

The fairness of the minimum intended value V_{MIN} made public in the bulletin board apparatus 21 can be verified, for example, through utilization of such secret sharing techniques as disclosed in Shamir, A, "How to Share a Secret," Comm. Assoc. Comput. March., vol. 22, no. 11, pp.612-613 (Nov. 1979). That is, for the values $H(A_j)$, $H(B_j)$ and $H(C_j)$ committed by the user, the user's committed values A_j , B_j and C_j can be disclosed by the cooperation of at least two of the three quantitative competition apparatuses. That is, $H(V_{\text{min}} \| A_j * B_j * C_j)$ can be verified.

After sending the concatenation elements $\text{Seq}_{s,\text{MIN}}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,\text{MIN}}$ from the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B to the bulletin board apparatus 21 for publication, that one of $\text{Seq}_{s,z}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,z}$ (where $z=1,2, \dots, \text{MIN}$) which was used for quantitative competition may be sent to the bulletin board apparatus 21 to reveal that V_{MIN} is valid.

As described above, according to the present invention, the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B extract from the respective sequences s_i and t_i (where $i=1, \dots, N$) the elements $s_{i,w}$ and $t_{i,w}$ corresponding to the value w specified by the bulletin board apparatus 21, then create the element concatenations $\text{Seq}_{s,w}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,w}$ with the extracted elements arranged in predetermined orders, then compare the element concatenations without revealing them, then decide whether there is a user having his intended value equal to or smaller than V_w (equal to or greater than V_w in the case of detecting the maximum value) depending on whether the concatenations are

equal or different, and change the value w based on the result of decision. The quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B need not always use the modular exponents $CA_w = HS_w^{RA_w} \pmod{P}$ and $CB_w = HT_w^{RB_w} \pmod{P}$, in which case they generate only $HS_w = h(\text{Seq}_{s,w})$ and $HT_w = h(\text{Seq}_{t,w})$ in steps S2A and 2B in Fig. 7, then send them to the bulletin board apparatus 21, and in step S4 compare them to decide whether they match each other. In this instance, however, if each element of the sequences s_i and t_i is simple-configured with one bit, for instance, then the element concatenation $\text{Seq}_{s,w}$ becomes simple, for example, $(0||1||1||0||1||0||0)$. By producing the concatenation $\text{Seq}_{s,w}$ of an arbitrary bit string and calculating its hash value, it becomes easy to find, by trial and error, a bit string that matches the published $HS_w = h(\text{Seq}_{s,w})$. Therefore, too much a simple element configuration is not preferable in terms of security. On the other hand, in the case of hiding the values HS_w and HT_w by concatenating them with the random numbers RA_w and RB_w , respectively, and hashing them as in the Fig. 7 embodiment, the 1-bit elements of the sequences s_i and t_i do not present any problem in terms of security. The 1-bit configuration of each element of the sequences s_i and t_i permits reduction of the amount of data for the encrypted information $E_A(s_i||R1_i)$ and $E_B(t_i||R2_i)$ that are sent from the user apparatus to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B--this provides the advantage of decreasing the channel capacity.

In the case of sending the hash values for verification use $H1_i = h(s_i||R1_i)$ and $H2_i = h(t_i||R2_i)$ to the bulletin board apparatus 21, too, the random numbers $R1_i$ and $R2_i$ are intended to increase security, and hence they need not always to be used. Accordingly, the hash values can be sent as $H1_i = h(s_i)$ and $H2_i = h(t_i)$ to the bulletin board apparatus 21.

Further, the above embodiments have been described to use the one-way functions for comparing the element concatenations $\text{Seq}_{s,w}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,w}$

without revealing their values, but it is also possible to encrypt the concatenations $\text{Seq}_{s,w}$ and $\text{Seq}_{t,w}$ by the same key and send the encrypted values to the bulletin board apparatus 21 for comparison.

In the first and third embodiments, for example, in the case of calculating the minimum value, it is possible to use a predetermined common one-way function for the two sequences of information s_i and t_i that are generated in the information sequence generating part 33 and determine seed values s'_i and t'_i that provide $F^d(s'_i) \neq F^d(t'_i)$ (where $d=0, 1, \dots, M-v_i$) and $F^e(s'_i) \neq F^e(t'_i)$ (where $e=M-v_i+1, \dots, M-1$) for the intended value. For example, $F^3(s'_i)$ is a multi-function representing $F(F(F(s'_i)))$. Accordingly, the sequences of information s_i and t_i become as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} s_i &= \{s_{i,1}=F^{M-1}(s'_i), s_{i,2}=F^{M-2}(s'_i), \dots, s_{i,v_i-1}=F^{M-v_i+1}(s'_i), s_{i,v_i}=F^{M-v_i}(s'_i), \dots, \\ s_{i,M-1}=F(s'_i), s_{i,M}=s'_i\} \\ t_i &= \{t_{i,1}=F^{M-1}(t'_i), t_{i,2}=F^{M-2}(t'_i), \dots, t_{i,v_i-1}=F^{M-v_i+1}(t'_i), t_{i,v_i}=F^{M-v_i}(t'_i), \dots, \\ t_{i,M-1}=F(t'_i), t_{i,M}=t'_i\} \end{aligned}$$

With this sequence generating scheme, when the seed values s'_i and t'_i , all the elements $s_{i,1}, \dots, s_{i,M}$ and $t_{i,1}, \dots, t_{i,M}$ can be calculated using the common one-way function. Accordingly, all the elements of the sequences of information s_i and t_i need not be incorporated in the encrypted sequences of information $E_A(s_i||R1_i)$ and $E_B(t_i||R2_i)$ that are sent from the user apparatus to the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B, but instead by sending the encrypted sequences of information with only seed values s'_i and t'_i incorporated therein, that is, $E_A(s'_i||R1_i)$ and $E_B(t'_i||R2_i)$, the quantitative competition apparatuses 15A and 15B can generate the sequences of information s_i and t_i from the seed values s'_i and t'_i through utilization of the common one-way function F .

A description will be given of how to determine the multi-function $F(x)$ for generating the sequences of information s_i and t_i based on the seed

values s'_i and t'_i and the seed values.

The user apparatus 11-i calculates primes p and q of proper sizes and calculates a composite number $n=p*q$. The composite number n is one that is used in the RSA cryptosystem based on the factoring problem. From the security point of view, it is preferable that the primes p and q have sizes of about 512 or 1024 bits and that $p-1$ and $q-1$ have large prime factors.

Then, the user apparatus 11-i generates random numbers a_k of values in the range of between 0 to $n-1$ for $k=0$ to m , and creates a polynomial

$$F(x) = a_m * x^m + a_{m-1} * x^{m-1} + \dots + a_1 * x + a_0.$$

Next, the user apparatus 11-i generates random numbers s'_i and t'_i of values in the range of between 0 and $n-1$, and set them as the seed values. After this, the user apparatus finds out a collision with $F(x) \bmod n$, for example, by such a scheme as described below.

Step 1: calculate $F^u(s'_i) \bmod n$ for $u=1, 2, \dots, c$, and stores the results of sequential calculations $F(s'_i)$, $F^2(s'_i)$, \dots , $F^c(s'_i)$, where c is a parameter that the user determines and $F^u(x)$ is a u -fold multi-function.

Step 2: Set $\text{flag}=0$, $v=0$ and $mx=c'$, where c' is a parameter that the user determines.

Step 3: Calculates $F^v(t'_i) \bmod n$, then stores the result of calculation, then makes a check to see if the calculated value matches any one of the values $F(s'_i)$, $F^2(s'_i)$, \dots , $F^c(s'_i)$ stored in step 1, and if any, set $\text{flag}=1$.

Step 4: If $\text{flag}=1$ or $v=c'$, discontinue the procedure, or if not, increment v by one and return to step S3.

In this case, the final state of $\text{flag}=1$ is equivalent to the detection of a collision. In general, however, since $F(x) \bmod n$ covers a wide range (approximately 1024 or 2048 bits), it is expected that the collision will not readily be found. By selecting a natural number n' smaller than n and replacing the original output $F(x) \bmod n$ with $(F(x) \bmod n) \bmod n'$ so as to

reduce the value of $F(x) \bmod n$ to a narrow range, the collision could be detected with more ease. In this case, for example, $(35 \bmod 15) \bmod 3$ is $5 \bmod 3 = 2$. At any rate, the following description will be given on the assumption that the collision has been detected.

Assuming that $F^{u-1}(s'_i) \neq F^{v'-1}(t'_i)$, $F^u(s'_i) = F^{v'}(t'_i)$, and the intended value V_{vi} is w -th counted from the minimum value V_1 , the sequences of information s_i and t_i can be constructed if $M-w+1 \leq u'$ and $M-w+1 \leq v'$. That is, the sequences of information need only to be set as follows:

$$s_i = \{s_{i,1} = F^{u'+w-2}(s'_i), \dots, s_{i,w} = F^{u'-1}(s'_i), \dots, s_{i,M} = F^{u'+w-M-1}(s'_i)\}$$

$$t_i = \{t_{i,1} = F^{u'+w-2}(t'_i), \dots, t_{i,w} = F^{u'-1}(t'_i), \dots, t_{i,M} = F^{u'+w-M-1}(t'_i)\}$$

Incidentally, the reason for which the composite number n , relying on the factoring problem, is used in $\bmod n$ is to inhibit easy factorization of a polynomial $F'(x) = F(x)/(x-x')$ when the constant x' is present. For example, noting an element $s_{i,k}$ of the sequence of information s_i , it can be seen that the intended value of the user $11-i$ is not V_k when there is present only one z that satisfies $F(z) = s_{i,k} \bmod n$.

With the above-mentioned collision search scheme, since there is a fear of leakage of information about the intended value, care should be taken in choosing the number n' . Conversely, when the conditions of the sequences of information s_i and t_i are not met, collision search steps 1 to 4 need only to be performed again.

A hash function may be used as the function $F(x)$. In such an instance, too, it is expected that the collision cannot readily be detected, but by reducing the output to a narrow range by the above-described scheme, the collision can be detected with ease. In some cases, however, it may become necessary to pad the input in association with the size of the output to be reduced.

With the method of sending only the seed value as described above, it

is possible to reduce the channel capacity and communication time for sending the sequence of information to each quantitative competition apparatus. Further, even if the number M of values choosable as the intended value V_{vi} is increased, the channel capacity remains unchanged since only the seed value is sent. On the other hand, in the case of using random numbers to generate the sequences of information as in the first embodiment, as the number M of values choosable as the intended value, the number of elements of each sequence of information increases accordingly, causing an increase in the channel capacity.

In the case of calculating the maximum value, too, all the elements of each sequence of information may be generated from the seed value through the use of the one-way function.

While the above embodiments determine the minimum value V_{MIN} among all of the users' intended values V_{vi} , the maximum intended value V_{MAX} can similarly be determined. In this instance, the two sequences of information s_i and t_i are adapted so that they differ in the information corresponding to the values equal to or greater than V_1 and equal to or smaller than V_{vi} and that they are common in the information corresponding to the values equal to or greater than V_{vi+1} and equal to or smaller than V_M . Further, in the comparisons between $Seq_{s,w}$ and $Seq_{t,w}$, between $HS_w = h'(Seq_{s,w})$ and $HT_w = h'(Seq_{t,w})$, and between $(HT_w^{RBw})^{RAw} \bmod P$ and $(HS_w^{RAw})^{RBw} \bmod P$ which correspond to the chosen value w , if they differ, it is judged that there is a user who has committed his intended value equal to or larger than V_w , and if they equal, it is judged that there is no user who has committed his intended value equal to or larger than V_w . When they equal, $w-1$ is substituted for w_{max} , and when they differ, w is substituted for w_{min} , after which the same processing as described above needs only to be repeated.

By determining the value w in the manner described above, the

minimum or maximum value can be calculated efficiently, but the quantitative competition may also be conducted, for example, by sequentially changing the value w from the value V_1 or V_M . Moreover, it is also possible that one quantitative competition apparatus determines the first value of w , sends it via the bulletin board apparatus 21 to the other quantitative competition apparatus, then receives necessary information from the bulletin board apparatus 21, and performs the processing shown in Fig. 7.

EFFECT OF THE INVENTION

As described above, the present invention permits implementation of a highly invulnerable quantitative competition method in which simply by sending from the user the information about his intended value to each quantitative competition apparatus and the bulletin board apparatus only once, the maximum or minimum value can be specified efficiently and, if necessary, only the user having committed the maximum or minimum value as his intended value can be specified.